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Off the Rails: The Cost Performance of Rail Projects 
 
Abstract: Governments in Australia place great emphasis on the development and expansion of 
their rail networks to improve productivity and service the increasing needs and demands from 
businesses and commuters. A case study approach is used to analyze the cost performance of 16 
rail projects constructed by a contractor between 2011 and 2014, which ranged from AU$3.4 to 
AU$353 million.  Findings indicate that scope changes during construction were the key 
contributors that lead to the amendment of each project’s original contractual value.  As a result, 
there is a need for public and private sector asset owners to establish a cost contingency using a 
probabilistic rather than a deterministic approach to accommodate the potential for scope 
changes during construction. To improve cost certainty during the construction of rail projects, it 
is suggested that use of collaborative forms of procurement juxtaposed with the use of Building 
Information Modelling and Systems Information Modelling are implemented. The utilization of 
such technological and process innovations can provide public and private sector asset owners 
charged with delivering and maintaining their rail networks with confidence projects can be 
delivered within budget and are resilient to unexpected events and adaptable to changing needs, 
uses or capacities. 
 
Keywords: Australia, BIM, collaboration, contingency, cost overrun, scope changes, SIM 
 
Introduction 
Investment in rail infrastructure is critical for improving the Australian economy’s productivity 
and competiveness. The Federal and State Governments have placed great emphasis on the 
development and expansion of their urban, non-urban and freight rail networks (Infrastructure 
Australia, 2016); in doing so, it may require the construction of new stations and tracks, 
extensions to existing lines, electrification of suburban networks, amplification and line upgrades 
and maintenance. It is, therefore, necessary that existing rail infrastructure is maintained to the 
highest standards and upgrades and new projects are completed on schedule so as not to 
adversely impact businesses and commuters. There is however a propensity for rail projects, 
irrespective of their size (i.e. in terms of contract value) in Australia to experience cost overruns 
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(Terrill and Dankes, 2016). Moreover, ‘large’ urban rail projects (i.e. in excess of AU$500 
billion) such as the Gold Coast light rail, Moreton bay rail link, Sydney light rail and the Perth-
Mandurah rail line have experienced significant cost overruns; the multitude of interdependent 
components and interfaces that exist when integrating infrastructure amplify the likelihood of 
cost overruns occurring (Terrill and Dankes, 2016). 
 
Evidence indicates that the problem of cost overruns is a worldwide phenomenon for rail 
infrastructure projects (e.g., Leavitt et al., 1993; Flyvbjerg et al., 2007; Canteralli et al., 
2012a,b,c). For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) the Edinburgh Tram System experienced 
a cost overrun in excess of 100%. In the United States (US), for example, several high profile rail 
projects have experienced significant overruns, namely (Grabauskas, 2015): the US$1.8 billion 
central link light-rail project in Seattle was 38% over budget; Phoenix’s US$1.07 billion East 
Valley light-rail project was 31% budget; San Francisco’s US$1.2 billion airport heavy-rail 
project, 30% over budget; and Los Angeles’ US$3 billion heavy-rail red line project, 47% over 
budget. These cases reiterate a never ending story for taxpayers; shortfalls in construction costs 
result in increased debt and thus increases in taxes, which can often span generations to repay the 
borrowed monies of government. This situation has become clearly the case in Honolulu rail 
transit project that commenced in 2008, which was expected to cost US$4 billion to construct 
(Mangieri, 2016) and is expected to exceed US$10 billion upon completion (Daysog, 2016). 
 
A major contributor of construction cost increases that have been experienced in the Honolulu 
rail transit project has been the limited supply of labor and the increasing cost of materials 
(Shimogawa, 2016). When preparing the budget estimate for project, forecasting the supply and 
demand of labor and materials is an arduous task, and in some instances may be impossible to 
determine, especially when estimators have to calculate construction costs months or even years 
in advance; in this instance ‘uncertainty’ prevails and ‘guesstimating’ occurs (Sing et al., 2012a; 
Sing et al., 2012b). In the case of the Sydney light rail project, for example, under estimation of 
the cost of moving utilities such as power cables significantly contributed to increased 
construction costs (Saulwick, 2014); this also occurred during the Edinburgh Tram System. 
Importantly, ‘as-built’ documentation for power cables seldom exist and if they do or they are 
often inaccurate (Love et al., 2016a). With different cities being characteristically unique (i.e. in 
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terms of their history, layout and structures), it is unrealistic to assume that an accurate forecast 
of the location of underground utilities can be undertaken. A ‘provisional sum’ (i.e. an allowance 
for undefined work), is therefore, typically provided when this situation arises (Smith et al., 
2016).  A design contingency (i.e. allocated for changes during design for factors such as 
incomplete scope definition and estimating inaccuracy) is required and subsequently reduced as 
more information becomes available. Prior to the commencement of construction, a contingency 
(i.e. where any unresolved design issues at the time of contract award are incorporated into the 
estimate/contract price) is also needed, though this often calculated deterministically rather using 
a probabilistic approach (Baccarini and Love, 2014; Love et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2016b).  
 
Research undertaken by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012c), for example, have 
provided an initial platform for understanding cost overruns in rail projects, particularly those 
classified as being ‘mega’ (i.e. in excess of $1 billion), in their size and complexity. Issues 
surrounding strategic misrepresentation, optimum bias and political machinations abounding 
have been over-emphasized in the planning and transport literature (e.g., Siemiatycki, 2009), 
with much of the research propagated being incorporeal (e.g., Love et al., 2012a; Osland and 
Strand 2015). Explanations of this nature, however, have attracted the interest of the media and 
when appropriate to opposition political parties and undoubtedly served as a point of reference to 
begin to understand why mega rail projects experience cost overruns (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Terrill 
and Dankes, 2016). 
 
Rather than focusing on ‘large’ and ‘mega’ projects, which have tended to be the focus of 
previous research studies in this area, an exploratory case study approach is used to analyze the 
cost performance of a combination of public and private sector rail projects constructed by a 
contractor between 2011 and 2014, which ranged from AU$3.4 to AU$353 million. While the 
public and private sector asset owners are diverse, the processes, procedures and technologies 
used by the contractor for rail projects were identical in nature. The research that is presented 
provides a much needed context to further explain the nature of cost overruns and how to 
mitigate their occurrence.  
 
Cost Overruns and Rail Projects  
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Two schools of thought have evolved to explain the nature of cost overruns in the transportation 
literature, these being the ‘Evolutionist’ and ‘Psycho Strategists’ (Love et al., 2016). Each 
approach provides a platform to recognize the extent and issues contributing to the cost overrun 
problem, but they are unable to provide a robust and balanced causal explanation of this 
phenomena. Considering the absence of a theory of cost overrun causation, Love et al. (2016) 
have suggested that a pluralistic probabilistic approach is required to accommodate the 
interdependencies that exist between causes so as to provide public and private sector asset 
owners with a holistic understanding of the uncertainties and risks that may derail the delivery 
and increase the cost of their transportation projects.   
 
While there have been a significant amount of studies that have examined cost overruns in road 
projects (e.g. Bordat et al. 2004; Odeck, 2004; Vidalis and Najafi, 2004; Liu et al., 2010; 
Canteralli et al., 2012a,b,c; Love et al., 2015a; Odeck et al., 2015; Verweji et al., 2016a; Terrill 
and Dankes, 2016), the number that have focused on rail projects has been limited (e.g., Pickrell, 
1990; Fourace et al., 1990; Leavitt et al., 1993; Dantata et al., 2006; Flyvbjerg et al., 2007); 
more research is needed to understand the dynamics and nuances of rail projects so as to 
contribute to the development of a theory of cost overrun causation. 
 
The sample size of rail projects that have been examined has been small, ranging from as low as 
10 (Pickrell) to a maximum of 169 (Canteralli et al., 2012c). According to Flyvbjerg (2007) rail 
tends to experience the largest cost overrun of all the types of transportation projects with a mean 
of 44.7%.  The reported mean cost overruns, however, differs significantly between studies in 
various countries; ranging, for example, 50% in the US (Pickrell, 1990), 10.6% in the 
Netherlands (Canteralli et al., 2012c), and 17% in Sweden (Lundberg et al., 2011). A primary 
reason for this observed disparity between studies is the ‘point of reference’ from where the cost 
overrun is measured (Love et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2016a). Within the planning and transport 
fraternity, the difference between initial forecasted budget and actual construction costs is 
typically used to calculate cost overruns (Canteralli et al., 2012a).  Between the initial forecasted 
budget of construction costs and the commencement of construction, several estimates will be 
prepared and refined before being lodged for approval.  
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Odeck (2004) has suggested that the reference point for determining a cost overrun should be at 
the detailed planning stage where design, specification and final cost are determined. 
Conversely, Love et al. (2015a) advocated that cost overruns should be determined at the point 
where a contract has been signed to perform the construction works. However, research 
undertaken by Terrill and Dankes (2016) has revealed that the timing of cost overruns occurs at 
different stages for transport projects. In the case of roads, for example cost overruns are larger 
during the planning stage as they tend to be bespoke.  According to the Parliament of New South 
Wales (2012), rail projects tend to be homogenous during their planning stage, as many key 
components are standardized and can be purchased at a known price. Problems tend to occur in 
rail projects during construction, as they are generally built on brownfield sites, and need to be 
integrated with existing infrastructure and on-going operations; the magnitude of the cost 
overruns occurring during their construction has been revealed to be significantly higher than 
that of road projects (Terrill and Dankes, 2016). The findings reported in Terrill and Dankes 
(2016) reiterates the need to have in place an adequate contingency that can accommodate 
changes that arise during construction and therefore provide an improved degree of cost 
certainty.  This will depend upon the procurement method that is adopted and the completeness 
of the tender documentation provided to the party/parties (i.e. contractor/consortium/joint 
venture) contracted to perform the required works.  
 
A significant omission by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012a,b,c) is that they have not 
fully acknowledged the influence that a procurement method and contract can have on a project’s 
costs. For example, if a rail project is to be delivered as an alliance contract, then a consortium 
can be ‘locked-in’ by the contract to provide a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) based on an 
initial budget estimate. Using procurement methods of this ilk can be used to transfer ‘design’ 
and ‘construction’ risks to a single entity. In addition, if a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or 
variant thereof such as Design Build Operate and Maintain is used, then at what point is a cost 
overrun determined? (Liu et al., 2016). The use of PPPs requires a scope to be completed prior to 
construction and provides a mechanism for trade-offs between construction and maintenance to 
be undertaken. In comparison to traditional forms of procurement, PPPs can reduce project costs, 
though their use for ‘large’ rail projects has been limited in Australia as there has been a 
preference to use alliance based contracts (Wood and Duffield, 2009; Terrill and Danks, 2016). 
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A comprehensive review of the factors influencing the variability between an initial forecasted 
budget and final tender sum has been provided in Adafin et al. (2016a,b) and includes: changes 
in owner/stakeholder requirements, planning requirements or restrictions, market conditions 
(e.g., fluctuations in labor prices), poorly prepared documentation, availability of design 
information and government legislation/policy. Issues, however, that have been eschewed by 
Adafin et al. (2016a) are optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, which may be used to 
influence the budget estimate and its subsequent management during the design development 
process. As noted above, to determine how the aforementioned issues influence the costs up to 
the point where a contract is signed prior to the commencement of construction is highly 
subjective.  
 
Irrespective of the point that is used to determine the cost overrun that is experienced, there 
remains a general consensus that rail projects, globally, are typically confronted by unnecessary 
expenditure increases. In Australia, for example, State Governments and their transport 
infrastructure deliver agencies have been criticized by the media (e.g. Moore 2016), lobby 
groups (e.g., Eco-Transit, 2015) and State Auditors (e.g., NSW Audit Office 2010; VAGO, 
2010) over the escalating cost of rail projects. According to Martin (2011) State Governments 
need to acquire improved knowledge about the costs of their rail projects so as to develop more 
robust and reliable business cases. An analysis of 26 major public rail projects delivered in 
Australia between 2000 and 2009 revealed significant differences in construct costs per km 
(Martin, 2011): for example, the 12 kilometer (km) Epping Chatswood Railway line in Sydney 
(heavy suburban line) was the most expensive at AU$193.36 million per km, whereas the 72km 
Perth-Mandurah Line (heavy suburban line) was a fraction of the cost, at a mere AU$17.36 
million per km. The cost difference between these two projects, for example, has engendered a 
perception that rail costs are higher than they should be in cities such as Sydney and Melbourne 
(Gatenby, 2009; Martin, 2011).  
 
Research Approach 
The research undertaken by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012a,b,c) was reliant on an 
‘international database’, but limited information is provided about ‘what’ and ‘how’ their data 
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was collated and why there was a reliance upon secondary sources. More specifically, the 
reliability of the data presented in Canteralli et al. (2012c) comes into question as they state “if 
the actual costs are unknown at the time of project completion, the most reliable later figure for 
actual costs is used (i.e. from a year later than the opening) if available. If unavailable, an earlier 
figure for actual costs could be used (i.e. from a year before the opening year), but only if 90% of 
the budget was spent at this time i.e. the project was 90% complete in financial” (p.326). In this 
instance, why and how was 90% determined? Notably, the percentage of projects that were 
deemed 90% complete are not presented by Canteralli et al. (2012c).  Furthermore, Canteralli et 
al. (2012c) make a comparison with Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) original dataset of 258 projects, 
which was collected from projects completed at different time points and from an array of 
countries. The construction techniques, technologies, legal jurisdictions, political and economic 
environments, client types and procurement arrangements also differed, yet these limitations 
were overlooked (Love et al., 2015a).  
 
The research presented in this paper sought to address these limitations and therefore used a case 
study approach to obtain data from a contractor who had extensive experience with constructing 
rail projects. A contractor who the researchers had collaborated with on several other studies was 
approached and their involvement in the study was solicited and subsequently obtained. Due to 
the paucity of empirical research and a lack of reliable primary cost data, an exploratory case 
study approach was undertaken to ameliorate understanding about the cost performance of rail 
projects (Shields and Rangarjan, 2013).  
 
The contractor made available the rail projects that had been constructed between 2011 and 
2014. The researchers were provided with access to each project’s cost information, which were 
stored in a consolidated database. Projects that had commenced in 2015 and were in progress in 
2016 were excluded from the research. Due to the commercial sensitivity of the data provided, 
only a brief description of each project is provided. Table 1 provides information about the type 
of project, the procurement methods used, the classification, location, original contract value, the 
cost change and the amount of scope changes that were incurred. While public and private sector 
asset owners sanctioning the identified projects were different, the contractor’s processes (e.g., 
quality assurance systems, safety management and contract administrative procedures), 
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technologies, and construction methods were standardized. In addition, it can be seen that the 
procurement methods used are also very similar, though this is often reflective of the business 
case that is established, the risk and complexity of the projects and prevailing economic 
conditions (Love et al., 2012b). 
 
 
Analysis  
A number of risk management tools can be used to determine an appropriate construction cost 
contingency, which include expert judgment, Monte Carlo simulation and Reference Class 
Forecasting (Love et al., 2015b; Terrill and Danks, 2016). There is ‘no best’ method to 
determine risk, but the approach that is selected needs to be reliable (i.e. uses objective 
information to counter optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation) and comprehensive (i.e. 
accounts for known, unknown, and known risks) (Terrill and Danks, 2016: p.49).  
 
During the design process there is a tendency to undertake detailed risk assessments (e.g., 
conduct Monte Carlo simulations) and then simply apply a standard up-lift rate 
(deterministically) at contract award for a construction contingency (Love et al., 2015b). Yet 
evidence suggests that the up-lift figure that is applied is rarely sufficient to cover the additional 
costs that are incurred during construction (Baccarini and Love, 2014). Having access to the 
distribution of costs impacting a project’s performance can enable both asset owners and 
contractors to ‘anticipate what might go wrong’. This can therefore enable mechanisms to be put 
in place to ensure a project meets its expected deliverables. State Governments such as 
Queensland’s Department of Main Roads (2015) and Infrastructure Australia (2016) have 
advocated the use of a probabilistic approach as part of a project risk management strategy. 
Thus, in accordance with practice, a Probability Density Function (PDF) was computed for a 
continuous distribution so that the likelihood for rail projects experiencing a cost overrun could 
be predicted. Descriptive statistics such as the mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and inter-
quartile were also calculated for the 16 rail projects constructed by the contracting organization.   
 
The PDF for a continuous distribution can be expressed in terms of an integral between two 
points: 
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𝑃 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑏
𝑎
    𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏         [Eq. 1] 
 
A cumulative distribution functions (CDF) was also produced. For theoretical continuous 
distributions the CDF is expressed as a curve and denoted by: 
 

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The empirical CDF, which is displayed as a stepped discontinuous line and dependent on the 
number of bins, is represented by: 
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The PDF, Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) and distribution parameters 
(  ,,,,,,, mk ) for continuous distributions such as Beta, Burr, Cauchy, Error, Gumbel 
Max/Min, Johnson SB, Normal, and Wakeby were examined using the estimation method 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates.  The ‘best fit’ distribution was then determined using the 
following ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests, which measure the compatibility of a random sample with a 
theoretical probability distribution:  
 
 Anderson-Darling statistic (A2): A general test to compare the fit of an observed CDF to an 
expected CDF. The test provides more weight to a distributions tails than the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The Anderson-Darling statistic is defined as: 
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 Chi-squared statistic (χ2): Determines if a sample comes from a population with a specific 
distribution. The Chi-squared statistic is defined as: 
 
          [Eq.5] 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (D): Based on the largest vertical difference between the 
theoretical and empirical CDF: 
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where Oi is the observed frequency for bin i, and Ei is the expected frequency of bin i 
calculated by: 
  
)()( 12 xFxFEi           [Eq.7] 
 
Here F is the CDF of the probability distribution being tested, and x1, x2 the limits for the bin 
i.  
 
The above ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were used to test the null (Ho) and alternative hypotheses (H1) 
of the datasets: H0 - follow the specified distribution; and H1 - do not follow the specified 
distribution.  The hypothesis regarding the distributional form is rejected at the chosen 
significance level (α) if the statistic D, A2, χ2 is greater than the critical value. For the purposes of 
this research, a 0.05 significance level was used to evaluate the null hypothesis.  
 
The p-value, in contrast to fixed α values is calculated based on the test statistic and denotes the 
threshold value of significance level in the sense that Ho will be accepted for all values of α less 
than the p-value.  Once the ‘best fit’ distribution was identified, the probabilities for a cost 
change were calculated using the CDF.  Then, to simulate the samples randomness and derive 
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the probabilities of a cost overrun (e.g., scope changes in this case) arising during construction, a 
Mersenne Twister, which is pseudorandom number generating algorithm, was used to generate a 
sequence of numbers that approximated the sample to 5000 (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998). 
 
 
 
Results 
The total value of rail projects that had been originally awarded to the contractor between 2011 
and 2014 was AU$539,569,997, with an M= AU$33,723,124 and SD=AU$78,398,023 (Table 1). 
The total value of work that was undertaken was AU$665,479,369, an increase of 19%. This 
additional increase was predominately due to client initiated scope changes. Two rail projects 
incurred cost increases other than the scope changes that were approved by their clients, namely 
an ‘Urban Track Upgrade’ and the ‘Installation and Maintenance of Concrete Sleepers’, which 
experienced non-conformances accounting for AU$397,978 and AU$115,560, respectively. 
Noteworthy, two projects experienced a cost underrun due to changes in scope. As it can be seen 
in Table 1, a variety of rail projects were undertaken such as ‘New Build’ (50%) and a 
combination of ‘New Build and Upgrades’ (25%) with most being constructed in Western 
Australia (WA) (63%). 
 
A total of 10 (63%) rails projects were procured using a ‘Traditional Lump Sum’ method, with 
three (19%) by ‘Traditional Cost-plus’, two (13%) by ‘Design and Construct’ and one (6%) 
using an Alliance contract. The three projects that used a ‘Traditional Cost-plus’ were for a 
private sector client. The ‘Alliance’ project, which was the largest rail project undertaken by the 
contractor, was undertaken in Victoria and formed part of one of Australia’s largest public 
infrastructure projects. The Victorian State Government often used an ‘Alliance’ procurement 
method as capital costs for this high risk complex projects due to it exceeding AU$50 million. 
The works included the laying of new tracks, the construction of new rail overpasses, 
modifications to existing bridges, extensive track reconfiguration and the upgrading of signaling 
systems.  
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The mean cost overrun from the contract award that was experienced for the 16 sampled projects 
was 23% (Table 2). Interestingly, two were delivered using a ‘Traditional Lump’ methods (13%) 
experienced cost underruns, with the remaining 50% incurring a mean cost overrun of 12.83%.  
The maximum cost overrun was 96.73% and the minimum was -4.19%.  If the initial budget 
estimate (also referred as the ‘Time of formal decision to build (ToD)) (Canteralli et al., 2012c) 
had been used as the point to determine the extent of the cost overrun, then there is no doubt that 
the figures presented would be significantly inflated.  For the ‘Iron Ore’ project, which incurred 
a cost overrun of 96.73%, the original scope of works was AU$1,200,000 and increased to 
AU$36,691,000. The contractor, however, was initially required to undertake site preparation 
works, but as the mine owner was under pressure to commence operations and ship its iron ore to 
market, new works were added to the existing cost-plus contract (i.e. the contractor was paid for 
their expenses, which were to a set limit plus an additional payment for profit), which had 
already been established. If a new contract had been created, then a cost overrun would not have 
been registered.  
 
Distribution Fitting: Probability of Cost Change 
The ‘best fit’ probability distribution was determined using the following ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests 
(Love et al., 2015b): Anderson-Darling, Chi-squared statistic and Kolmogorov-Smirnov,  The 
results of the ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests revealed that Three Parameter (3P) Frechet distribution 
provided the best fit for the dataset (Table 3).  
 
< Insert Table 3. Goodness of Fit Tests for rail projects > 
 
A Frechet is a form of generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) that is used as an 
approximation to model the maxima of long (finite) sequences of random variables (Coles, 
2001).  The PDF is expressed as: 
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The CDF is expressed as: 
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𝛼 is a continuous shape parameter with 𝛼 > 0 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾 is a continuous location parameter 
where 𝛾 ≡ 0  yields the two parameter-Frechet distribution. The domain for the 3P Frechet 
distribution is 𝛾 < 𝑥 < +∞. 
 
The parameters for the Frechet (3P) were found to be α = 2.496, β = 31.459 and γ = -22.568. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the PDF and CDF based upon the calculated distribution parameters. The 
calculated probabilities, based upon 3
rd
 quantile (75%), a cost overrun being experienced are 
presented in Table 4. The probability of experiencing a cost change of >10% is 32%. Delimiters 
have also been used to provide probabilities of cost changes within ranges.  The probability of a 
project experiencing between a 15% and 25% cost change, for example, is 17% (Figure 4).  For a 
mean cost overrun of 23% to be experienced the likelihood of occurrence is 60% (P (x < x1) = 
.67) from contract award.  Explicitly, the construction cost contingency for 14 of the sampled 
projects was unable to accommodate the scope changes that were needed for them to serve their 
intended purpose.  At contract award, Clark and Lorenzoni (1985) have suggested using an up-
lift contingency value of 3% to 5% of a project’s contract value to accommodate unresolved 
design issues; in the case of the rail projects sampled, the use of a deterministic approach is 
clearly does not accommodate the percentage increase in costs that were incurred. 
 
Discussion 
Delivering rail projects within their forecasted construction cost is a priority for public and 
private sector organizations.  The analysis demonstrates the likelihood of rail projects exceeding 
a 20% overrun is high based on current practices. In an attempt to ensure cost certainty in rails 
projects, procurement methods such as ‘Traditional Lump Sum’, ‘Design and Construct’ and 
‘Alliances’ are often employed.  In the case of a ‘Traditional Lump Sum’ method, the public 
sector generally accepts that design work will generally be separate from construction.  
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Consultants are appointed for design and cost control only, and the contractor is responsible for 
carrying out the works for a fixed sum. This responsibility extends to all workmanship and 
materials, and includes all work by subcontractors and suppliers. The contractor is usually 
appointed by competitive tendering on complete information, but may if necessary, be selected 
earlier by negotiation on the basis of partial or notional documentation and undertakes to carry 
out a defined amount of work in return for an agreed sum.  
According to Love et al. (2012b) the concept of cost certainty is a fallacy when using traditional 
methods that are based upon full drawings and bills of quantities (BoQ). In principle this 
approach should provide the public and private sector  asset owners with a firm, fixed price for 
construction, but in practice very few projects are actually completed within their tendered price 
(Rowlinson, 1999); this was clearly evident in the rails projects that were examined. Complete 
drawings and BoQs are generally unavailable when a projects goes to tender and the 
documentation and often contains errors and omissions, which may result in scope changes and 
rework being made undertaken during construction (Love et al., 2012a).  
 
With ‘Design and Construct’ methods, a contractor accepts responsibility for some or all of the 
design. Design and  construct  methods  offer  certainty  on  the  contract  sum with the provision 
of a GMP and  bring  cost  benefits.  The close integration of design and construction methods 
and the relative freedom of the contractor to use their purchasing power and market knowledge 
most effectively, can provide the public and private sector with a competitive price. However, 
changes in scope can be costly. Considering the inherent degree of cost certainty that this form of 
procurement method can provide, it was surprising to find that costs were incurred, but both 
projects in question were constructed in an urban environment; a close examination of the scope 
changes revealed that additional work was required to relocate underground utilities. Similarly, 
the scope changes approved by the public authority generally related to unexpected signaling 
issues and integrating newly installed communication systems with an existing mainline station 
power distribution network.  
 
It has been widely acknowledged that collaborative procurement method such as ‘Alliances’ and 
‘Design and Construct’ and PPPs can provide improved cost performance and value-for-money 
for the public sector (e.g. Muriro and Wood, 2010). In fact, as noted above, PPPs have been 
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demonstrated superior cost-efficiency over traditional methods ranging from 30.8% (from 
project inception) to 11.4% (from contractual commitment to final outcome) (Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia, 2008). Despite the cost benefits that have been found to materialize from 
the use PPPs, they have also received widespread criticism, particularly with dealing with risk 
transfers over an assets life (e.g. Hodge, 2004). The Latham (1994) and Egan Reports published 
in the UK (1998) served as a catalyst for reforming the construction industry so that the 
performance of projects would improve. Moving forward 20 years and it can be observed that the 
level of cost overruns occurring has not diminished; a conclusion also propagated by Flyvbjerg et 
al. (2003). Cost overruns, however, will remain a pervasive problem unless fundamental changes 
are made to the way in which projects are governed, procured (e.g., collaborative relationship 
contracting, and bundling) and technological innovations are embraced, so as to improve the cost 
performance and management of information throughout an assets life-cycle (Love et al., 
2015a).  
 
Improving Cost Estimation 
Following the strategic justification phase, which examines what is required to meet the demands 
and needs of the public and business community rail needs, an initial budget estimate is 
prepared.  Typically, the initial estimate increases as the project progresses through the design 
development process.  Having to constantly revise and amend the initial budget can be disruptive 
and may result in shortfalls in public funding occurring (Department of Transport and Main 
Roads, 2015). The performance of an initial budget estimate can only be assessed when a project 
is completed. Thus, the initial budget estimate needs to contain sufficient design contingency to 
accommodate changes to a projects scope. It is during this stage that those responsible for 
preparing the initial budget estimate may succumb to optimism bias.  
 
To ensure the reliability of the initial budget estimate and contingency, external professionals’ 
advice and evaluation, particularly cost consultants (e.g., quantity surveyors), should be sought.  
In-line with contemporary procurement thinking (e.g., Loosemore, 2016), it is suggested that 
there needs to be shift-away from traditional to relational methods and therefore involve 
contractors in vetting initial budgets.  Indeed, this can be considered to be a controversial idea as 
questions associated probity may arise. Nevertheless, the aim here would be to remove 
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‘uncertainties’ and identify to potential risks that may materialize; the inclusion of contractor’s 
early input in the design process would improve a project’s constructability and provide a 
platform engendering collaboration between parties. When contractors assess the initial budget 
they could also be invited to identify innovative methods of construction; it is suggested that any 
advice provided would be fee-based and issues associated with intellectual property would need 
to be resolved, if they were not awarded a contract to deliver the works. Naturally, as a project 
moves through its various stages of development key decision-makers and policy advisors need 
to sign-off and approve the estimate as its evolves.  
 
At the initial budget stage, it has been suggested that a contingency of 30% to 50% should be 
allowed for incomplete scope and 5% to 10% for estimating inaccuracies (Clark and Lorenzoni, 
1985). Therefore, as a rule of thumb, a 35% to 60% design contingency should be added to the 
initial budget estimate figure. For example, the Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015), 
for example, there is an expectation that initial budget estimates have a 90% confidence factor 
(P90) of not being exceeded at completion. Producing an estimate with such a high confidence 
factor is dependent upon having access to good quality information (e.g., costs from previous 
projects, specific requirements of stakeholders, procurement options, and market conditions).  A 
series of cost scenarios that can materialize in projects are presented in Figures 5 to 7. The ideal 
scenario is one where the budget estimate that is established excluding the contingency equals 
the final cost. This is an unlikely scenario considering the existing practices and processes that 
are used to design and construction rail projects and the limited understanding of the systemicity 
and interdependency of risk (Love et al., 2016a).  
 
< Figure 5. The ideal cost scenario > 
 
< Insert Figure 6. An acceptable cost scenario > 
 
< Insert Figure 7. Unacceptable cost scenario > 
 
In the projects sampled, an unusually high proportion of the cost overruns were due to scope 
changes. The nature of these changes could not be quantified within the sample of projects that 
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were analyzed due to their commercial sensitivity, but considering previous empirical research 
that has been undertaken, they were likely to be attributable due to client initiated design 
changes, errors or omissions contained within the design documentation (Love et al., 2004). For 
the rail projects presented in this research, the probability of scope changes is established based 
on existing practices to document and management information, which was undertaken using the 
medium of Computer-Aided-Design (CAD) by independent design and engineering disciplines. 
 
Improving Information Quality 
An unacceptable cost scenario, which may well have arisen within the rail projects procured via 
‘Cost-plus’ methods, can be seen in Figure 7. In such situations there is an overwhelming 
precedence to ensure that the rail asset operates as soon as possible, and as a result of this 
urgency its scope becomes poorly defined. To reduce the scope changes, and improve the quality 
of information that is made available for purposes of decision-making throughout a rail assets 
life, technological and process innovations such as Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
(Figure 8) and Systems Information Modelling (SIM) (Figure 9) should be implemented 
simultaneously (Love et al., 2016b,c). 
 
The US National Building Information Model Standard Project Committee (2015) has defined 
BIM as “a digital representation of physical and functional characteristics of a facility. A BIM is 
a shared knowledge resource for information about a facility forming a reliable basis for 
decisions during its life-cycle, which is defined as existing from earliest conception to 
demolition”.  A SIM, however, is a derivative of BIM, but ‘Building’ is replaced with ‘System’ 
to represent the process of modeling complex connected systems, such as electrical control, 
power and communications (herein after electrical systems), which do not possess geometry 
(Love et al., 2016b,c). Essentially, a SIM takes a discipline specific perspective, but can be 
integrated within a BIM when a single point of truth is formed.  
 
When a SIM is applied to engineer and document a system, all the physical equipment and 
associated connections, similarly to constructing a building information model, are modeled in a 
relational database with each component modeled only once resulting in a 1:1 relationship 
between the SIM and the real world. However, when using CAD, which has been and remains 
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the preferred method to document the design of electrical systems within the rail sector, each 
object in the real world may appear on multiple drawings and each drawing may contain a 
number of objects. Thus, an n:n relationship is formed between the real-world objects and the 
drawings, and propensity for errors and omissions to materialize significantly increases as 
changes to individual CAD drawings need to be undertaken and up-dated manually. 
 
< Insert Figure 8. Extracts from a building information model for a rail project> 
< Insert Figure 9. Creation of a retrospective SIM from a rail project > 
 
When BIM is used to establish an initial budget estimate, its visualization capacity can be used to 
explore design solutions and develop a preliminary construction program, undertake life-cycle 
costing, functional analysis and cost benchmarking. From the on-set stakeholders can visualize 
the rail asset, which can enable critiques and modifications to be made while instantaneously 
being able to determine the impact on the project’s cost, particularly during construction. As the 
design and engineering mature, costs can be monitored and alternative options analyzed. With 
the early involvement of a contractor, for example, the potential of optimism bias can be 
significantly diminished as ‘checks and balances’, as well as costs that reflect actual market 
prices can be considered and brought to the fore.  
 
Early contractor involvement may not always be feasible and practical, and will invariably 
depend upon the value of the project. However, this does not discount the influence that the 
independent design team can have in using BIM to ensure the constructability and the cost 
effectiveness of various options that may be put forward for consideration. For example, in 
Figure 8, a number of scenarios that can be modelled and examined in a BIM environment for a 
rail project are presented: a tunnel’s alignment can be modelled juxtaposed with Geographical 
Information Systems, track schedule progress can be tracked and visualized (4D), and cost and 
schedule progress of stations can be monitored in real-time as construction is being undertaken 
(5D).  
 
Working within a BIM environment will significantly reduce scope changes and thus provide 
greater cost certainty (Hartman et al., 2012). It is therefore anticipated that when BIM is applied 
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to rail projects the probability of cost overruns being incurred will dramatically reduce. To 
achieve the real benefits of a BIM solution requires collaboration between all parties who are 
selected to deliver a rail asset, particularly when there is a requirement to produce a building 
information model is utilized during Operations and Maintenance (O&M). London’s ₤14.8 
billion Crossrail network project has been applying BIM to help planners integrate new train 
lines into existing infrastructure (Peplow, 2016). According to Peplow (2016) the use of BIM has 
saved time and money by reducing construction errors, which often manifest as additional costs 
as scope changes or rework. The use of clash detection, laser scanning, compliance checking, 
sensors to check and monitor the integrity of the rail network, have all contributed to ensure 
mitigating scope changes and rework in Crossrail, and as a result have contributed to ensuring 
the assets integrity for O&M.   
 
Rail projects are dependent on electrical systems to function. Like BIM, a SIM can be used to 
establish the initial budget estimate for such systems and provide approximate quantities as cable 
lengths, connectors and devices can be determined when the route for the project has been 
established. Empirical research has demonstrated that the use of a SIM during design can provide 
as much as a 90% reduction in the amount time and cost to prepare documentation (Love et al., 
2013). In addition, a SIM significantly reduces the propensity for errors and omissions to be 
made as well as information redundancy in documentation thereby minimizing the proclivity of 
scope changes during construction.   
 
Being able to provide information in a format that does not possess ‘noise’ is an essential 
ingredient in developing an initial budget estimate for electrical systems. Rail projects often 
require up-grades to tracks and maintenance and estimating the cost of such projects requires an 
understanding of not only the new work to be undertaken but also the existing network. Using 
3D laser scanning, high-resolution imagery from linear and real world positions, an existing 
network can be integrated with the new design and its costs appropriately determined (Figure 8).  
 
Limitations 
Akin to Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012c), this research presented has limitations. 
The most notable is the sample size, which was limited to 16, though a Mersenne Twister, was 
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used to generate a sequence of pseudorandom numbers that approximated the sample to 5000. 
The data, however, is homogenous, reliable and is reflective of ‘actual’ costs that were incurred.  
While the projects were diverse in their geographical location, they are not representative of 
Australia; the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Northern Territory (NT), Queensland (QLD) 
and Tasmania are not represented. This is important considering that in New South Wales and 
Victoria have been identified as experiencing higher construction costs for rail than other States 
and Territories.  
 
Unfortunately, the findings could not be compared with Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. 
(2012c) as procurement methods, construction costs, scope changes incurred, and economic 
conditions were not presented. In addition, Flyvbjerg (2007) focused upon ‘mega’ projects, 
which are unique and thus are unable to be compared to the general works programs undertaken 
by State Governments and asset owners. The economic climate within which projects were 
undertaken between 2011 and 2014 was significantly different between Australia States and the 
ACT and when Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012c) conducted their studies. For 
example, WA (also NT and QLD, though projects were constructed by the contractor from 2011 
to 2014) was experiencing an economic boom and significant increases in population growth due 
to a demand for energy mineral resources, while other States and the ACT were experiencing 
significantly reduced levels economic activity.  
 
Conclusions 
The cost performance of rail infrastructure projects has received considerable attention as they 
are seldom delivered within budget, particularly those classified as being ‘mega’ projects. As a 
result, research has tended to place emphasis on projects of that are of the ‘mega’ magnitude and 
provide additional explanations as to ‘why’ and ‘how’ cost increases arise. The justifications put 
forward for those being classified as being ‘mega’ while plausible are divorced from the actual 
data that has been presented, even the solutions for improving the accuracy of budget estimates 
do not reflect the complexity, systemicity and interdependency of risk that can arise during the 
delivery of rail projects.  
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Recognizing these shortcomings, this paper examines the cost performance of a sample of 16 rail 
projects that were constructed by a single contractor.  Cost performance for the rail projects was 
calculated from the contract award until final completion, which has been in stark contrast to 
planning and transport literature that has focused on using the initial budget estimate or the 
decision to build as the reference point for its determination. Consequently, the determination of 
cost performance from contract award provides a realistic measure of the overrun/underrun that 
materializes as a degree of certainty is assured to the asset owner as an agreed sum for the works 
to be completed is established.  
 
The analysis revealed that a mean cost overrun of 23% of the original contract value, with 99% 
of the total cost increase incurred being due to scope changes. Considering prevailing practice, 
the probability of cost overruns arising where determined so that adequate contingency could be 
established in the future. It appears, however, that the magnitude of cost increases being 
experienced in rail projects are not decreasing and the problem remains the same as of fifty years 
ago or more.  
 
In addressing this problem, changes in the way that the initial budget estimate and its 
development needs to be undertaken by the public and private sector asset owners of rail 
infrastructure, which include: 
   
 the determination of contingencies based upon probabilistic methods such as distribution 
fitting identified and demonstrated in this research, particularly for construction; 
 the greater use of collaborative procurement methods such as Alliances, which includes 
financial incentives so as to ensure a guaranteed maximum prices; 
 third party audit of the initial budget by external consultants to minimize the potential for 
optimism bias; 
 involvement of contractors, particularly those specializing in electrical systems early in the 
design process to provide constructability advice with particular emphasis being placed on 
the evaluation of initial budget estimate; and 
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 the use of Building Information Modelling (BIM) and Systems Information Modelling 
(SIM), which can be used to mitigate scope changes and thereby reduce the size of the 
contingency that is required for construction.  
 
The cost overrun phenomena is a complex and challenging problem to address. This paper does 
not attempt to provide answers, but a way forward in dealing with this issue. There is a need, 
however, to better determine construction cost contingencies; but the use of collaborative forms 
of procurement juxtaposed with the use of BIM and SIM will provide the public and private 
sector asset owners charged with delivering and maintaining rail networks with confidence that 
projects can be delivered cost effectively and are resilient to unexpected events and adaptable to 
changing needs, uses or capacities. 
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Table 1. Cost information for rails projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 by geographical region (n=16) 
 
Project Type 
 
Procurement 
Method 
Classification 
 
State 
Original Contract 
Value ($) 
Final Contract 
Value ($) 
Cost 
Difference 
% Cost 
Change 
Scope 
Changes ($)  
Installation and Maintenance of 
Concrete Sleepers 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Up-grade and 
Maintenance 
Western 
Australia 
12,905,657 12,386,515 -519,141 -4.19 -403,581 
Track Extension and Installation of a 
Crossing 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
3,480,286 3,418,423 -61,863 -1.81 -61,863 
Modification and Upgrade of Track 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build and 
Up-grade 
Western 
Australia 
5,404,773 6,382,221 977,448 15.32 977,448 
Iron Ore Track Extension (Spur Line) 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
3,293,777 3,715,808 422,030 11.36 422,030 
Track Maintenance  
 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Maintenance 
New South 
Wales 
15,816,417 17,040,378 1,223,961 7.18 1,223,961 
Track Inspection and Maintenance 
Depot 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
New South 
Wales 
2,687,086 3,585,429 898,343 25.05 898,343 
New Trackwork   
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
2,501,453 3,341,107 839,653 25.13 839,653 
Urban Light Rail 
Design and 
Construct 
New Build 
New South 
Wales 
81,519,436 106,472,525 24,953,089 23.44 24,953,089 
New Signals 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Up-grade 
South 
Australia 
8,942,956 9,761,790 81,8834 8.39 81,8834 
Urban Rail Revitalization - 
Electrification 
Design and 
Construct 
Electrification 
South 
Australia 
15,037,635 17,333,340 2,295,705 13.24 2,295,705 
Regional Rail ( Includes new track and 
station, bridge refurbishment) 
Alliance 
Contract 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Victoria 
318,307,311 353,376,242 35,068,931 9.92 35,068,931 
Urban Rail (Track Extension) 
 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
23,959,264 25,385,033 1,425,769 5.62 1,027,891 
Freight Track 
 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
12,748,006 28,369,461 15,621,455 55.06 15,621,455 
Urban Track Upgrade  
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Western 
Australia 
29,914,480 31,352,254 1,437,774 4.59 1,437,774 
Iron Ore Track Extension (Spur Line) 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Western 
Australia 
1,851,459 6,867,640 5,016,181 73.04 5,016,181 
Iron Ore New Build 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build 
 
Western 
Australia 
1,200,000 36,691,197 35,491,197 96.73 35,491,197 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for cost change 
 
Statistic 
Value 
(%) 
 
 
Range 100.92 
Mean 23.00 
Variance 793.15 
Std. Deviation 28.16 
Coef. of Variation 1.22 
Std.Error 7.04 
Skewness 1.70 
Excess Kurtosis 2.33 
Min -4.19  
5% -4.19  
10% -2.52  
25% (Quartile 1) 6.01  
50% (Median) 12.3  
75% (Quartile 3) 25.11  
90% 80.14  
95% 96.73  
Max 96.73  
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Table 3. Goodness of Fit Tests 
Distribution Type Sig. 
α Level 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (D) 
Critical Value 
Anderson 
Darling (A
2
) 
Critical Value 
Chi-squared 
(χ2) 
Critical Value 
Frechet 3P 
(Rail Projects)  
0.2 0.25778 1.3749 1.6424 
0.1 0.29472 1.9286 2.7055 
0.05 0.32733 2.5018 3.8415 
0.02 0.36571 3.2892 5.4119 
0.01 0.39201 3.9074 6.6349 
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Table 4. Examples of probabilities of cost overrun 
 
Probability Cost 
Overrun 
P(X < X1) P(X > X1) P(X1< X < X2) P(X < X2) P(X >X2) 
1 and 5% 
 
0.13 0.87 0.12 0.25 0.75 
6 and 10% 
 
0.28 0.72 0.12 0.40 0.60 
11 and 15% 
 
0.43 0.57 0.09 0.53 0.47 
16 and 20% 
 
055 0.45 0.08 0.62 0.38 
21 and 25% 
 
0.64 0.36 0.06 0.70 0.30 
26 and 30% 
 
0.71 0.29 0.04 0.75 0.25 
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of rail projects 
  
Traditional Cost Plus and located in 
Western Australia 
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Figure 2. Frechet 3P: PDF for cost change 
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Figure 3. Frechet 3P: CDF for cost change 
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Figure 4. PDF with delimiters between 15% and 25% cost change 
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Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.4) 
Figure 5. The ideal cost scenario 
  
  
38 
 
 
Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.5) 
Figure 6. An acceptable cost scenario 
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Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.5) 
Figure 7. Unacceptable cost scenario 
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Figure 8. Extracts from a Building Information Model for a rail project 
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Figure 9. Creation of a Systems Information Model for a rail project  
